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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the redistributive efficiency of public spending and taxation in a panel of 
28 OECD economies during the period 1995-2010. In order to explore how redistribution is 
achieved through fiscal policies, a two-stage approach is applied. First, we evaluate the 
redistributive efficiency of public spending and taxation by using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and obtain considerable variation in redistributive efficiency scores across countries. 
Second, we use panel regression analysis to identify the determinants of these differences and 
reveal the crucial role of factors capturing the capacity of public officials to design and 
implement redistributive policies, and political economy factors potentially affecting the 
redistributive profile of fiscal policies. 
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1 Introduction 
The fact that income inequality has generally been rising in both advanced and developing 
economies in recent decades (OECD 2008 and 2011; IMF 2014), coupled with the growing 
realization that inequality could be harmful for economic growth and development,
1
 
highlights the need for policies that can reduce inter-personal income differences. In this 
context, the redistributive potential of fiscal policies, both on the tax and spending sides, can 
play an important role. 
The capacity of countries to deploy fiscal policies to reduce income differences faces 
important budgetary restrictions. Developing countries tend to have smaller public sectors and 
thus fewer fiscal resources available to address inequalities (Barreix et al. 2007; Goñi et al. 
2011). And some developed countries have experienced an unprecedented increase in public 
debt in the context of the Great Recession of 2007-09, raising serious concerns about fiscal 
sustainability. Against this backdrop, many governments have been making substantial fiscal 
adjustments through a combination of spending cuts and tax hikes to reduce their ratios of 
debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the same time, public support for redistributive 
policies has grown, especially in advanced economies where the crisis has hit hardest (see, 
IMF 2014). 
Because of increasing income inequalities and scarce budgetary resources, attention needs to 
be paid to the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policies: efficiency allows the attainment of a 
given level of redistribution at lower levels of spending and taxes, or the attainment of more 
redistribution at given tax and spending levels. 
A range of studies have used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency of 
government spending, either total spending or spending in specific policy areas, in attaining a 
range of socio-economic objectives such as health and education outcomes (see, for example 
Gupta and Verhoeven 2001 and Afonso et al. 2005). A number of contributions have gone 
further by, moreover, examining a set of non-discretionary factors that may explain cross 
country differences in public sector efficiency.
2
 Thus, Herrera and Pang (2005), Afonso and 
St. Aubyn (2006), St. Aubyn et al. (2009), Afonso et al. (2010) and Hauner and Kyobe 
(2010), use the DEA methodology to calibrate the efficiency of health, education or social 
spending in the pursuit of specific socio-economic objectives and then explain cross-country 
differences in government efficiency by way of factors which, they argue, are immutable in 
the short run.  
In this article we focus on how efficient fiscal policies are in terms of redistribution and 
examine those variables which determine redistributive efficiency. Of course, different fiscal 
policies can have different objectives such as macroeconomic stability, public good provision, 
economic growth or redistribution. But regardless of their objective, public spending and tax 
policies may potentially impact on the distribution of income (see Woo et al. 2013 and IMF 
2014 for surveys of empirical work). Our interest here is to apply DEA methodology, to 
examine the overall impact of fiscal policy on the distribution of income and specifically we 
aim to consider how efficient total spending and taxation (both over GDP) are in 
redistributing income. Having done so, we then aim to uncover those factors that might 
                                                 
1
For economic channels through which inequality might be harmful for long term growth and development see 
Galor and Zeira (1993), Perotti (1996) and Dahan and Tsiddon (1998); for political-economy explanations, see 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Benabou (2000 and 2005) and Glaeser et al. (2004). 
For surveys see Aghion et al. (1999), Halter et al. (2014) or Ostry et al. (2014). 
2
 This two-step approach currently prevails in the DEA literature (see, Liu et al. 2013).  
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explain cross-country differences in the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy based on 
panel truncated, OLS and bootstrap truncated regressions.
3
 
We analyze the impact of public expenditure and taxes since both affect the distribution of 
income (see Martinez Vazquez et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2012 and 2014; Muinelo-Gallo and 
Roca-Sagalés 2013). Moreover, we consider the impact of fiscal policy on two measures of 
redistribution that exploit the difference between market inequality (before government 
transfers and taxes) and net income inequality (after government transfers and taxes) – 
measures that we fully explain below.  
Our first stage results, based on the DEA analysis applied to a panel of 28 developed 
countries for the period 1995-2010, allow us to identify countries with similar spending and 
tax levels that obtain very different redistributive results signaling important differences in 
redistributive efficiency across countries. Moreover, our second stage results obtained from 
panel truncated and OLS regression analysis, points to the crucial role when explaining these 
differences of factors reflecting on the capacity of public officials to design and implement 
redistributive policies, as well as political demand and supply factors potentially affecting the 
redistributive profile of fiscal policies. The paper is structured as follows. After analyzing the 
redistributive role of fiscal policy in section 2, we explain the empirical methodology and the 
data in sections 3 and 4, discuss the results in section 5 and then conclude the article. 
 
2 Fiscal policy and redistributive efficiency 
Fiscal policy is the primary tool through which governments can affect the distribution and 
redistribution of income (Lambert 2001). Both tax and spending policies can alter this 
distribution, both over the short and medium term. The use of regression-based models to 
study the redistributive impact of fiscal policy has grown in recent years. A range of empirical 
studies have regressed measures of net income inequality on fiscal policy variables in order to 
explain their distributive impact. In this sense, it is possible to distinguish between two main 
groups of contributions. A first group discuss the impact of fiscal policies on income 
distribution in OECD countries and find a significant negative effect of government spending 
and taxes on inequality (for example, Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés 2013) and an 
especially strong redistributive effect coming from transfers (OECD 2012) or specifically 
from public pensions (Huber and Stephens 2006 and Wang et al. 2012 and 2014). A second 
group of studies evaluates the distributive impact of different fiscal policies implemented in 
developing countries showing, in general, very weak effects (Chu et al. 2000 and 2004). 
Overall, these two lines of work show that the distributive impact of fiscal policies is strongly 
related to the level of economic development and to the specific spending and tax policies 
adopted.
4
 
While this literature provides important insights into the impact of fiscal policies on income 
distribution, it does not evaluate the efficiency of these policies with regards to redistribution. 
Afonso et al. (2010) reports significant cross-country differences in the efficiency of social 
spending in reducing net income inequality. However, in order to evaluate redistributive 
efficiency, we cannot simply rely on net income inequality for several reasons. First, this 
variable measures inequality after redistribution has already taken place, and consequently it 
doesn’t provide information on redistribution itself. Second, relying on net income inequality 
to account for redistributive effort ignores the possibility that the evolution of net inequalities 
                                                 
3
 The use of panel data has been less frequent in this literature. The exceptions are Hauner and Kyobe (2010), 
Wolszczak and Parteka (2011) or Grigoli (2014). 
4
 For a complete survey of this empirical literature see IMF (2014) and Ostry et al. (2014). 
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may also be due to changes in market income inequalities which, beyond fiscal policies, may 
occur because of globalization and technological change as well as other policies such as 
product and labor market regulation (OECD 2011). Thus, if we were to assess redistributive 
efficiency based exclusively on net income inequalities, this could lead us to assign changes 
in inequality exclusively to fiscal policy and ignore the possibility that these changes may also 
be due to the evolution of market income. 
In this article, we take advantage of the recent income inequality database developed by Solt 
(2009, 2014) that combines information from available surveys to infer comparable series of 
Gini coefficients for market and net income inequality in an extended sample of countries and 
years. Specifically we employ Solt’s (2014) relative and absolute redistribution measures 
which are obtained as the difference between the Gini coefficient for market and for net 
income (absolute redistribution), as well as expressing the prior difference as a proportion of 
the Gini coefficient for market income (relative redistribution). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In order to illustrate the usefulness of these measures, figure 1 plots both redistributive 
variables against net income inequality using data from the economies included in our sample. 
It shows that economies with similar levels of net income inequality have very different levels 
of relative and absolute redistribution. For instance, Sweden and Slovenia in Group I, present 
net income Gini values close to 23 but very different levels of relative and absolute 
redistribution, stemming from the fact that Sweden has achieved greater reductions in market 
inequality. Specifically, market inequality in Sweden is much higher than that in Slovenia (47 
versus 38). So obviously, Sweden has experienced a significantly larger change in the 
distribution of income than Slovenia. If we were to measure the redistributive impact of fiscal 
policy based on net income inequality, we could conclude that this is very similar. If instead 
we employ the relative or absolute redistribution indicator which also accounts for market 
inequality, we may observe substantial differences in the redistributive effect of fiscal 
policies. Similar examples include Germany versus Switzerland in Group II and Latvia versus 
Estonia in Group III.  
 
3 Empirical methodology 
In this section we detail the DEA methodology used to empirically evaluate the redistributive 
efficiency (absolute and relative) of fiscal policy, and then explain the empirical approach 
used to identify the non-discretionary determinants of this efficiency. 
 
3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis methodology 
Data Envelopment Analysis is a linear programming technique which identifies the optimal 
performance within a sample and computes efficiency scores by taking differences between 
observed and best practice decision making units (DMUs), in our case countries.  
The DEA belongs to a range of nonparametric frontier methods.
5
 With DEA, efficiency is 
defined with respect to a production possibility frontier, which indicates feasible output levels 
                                                 
5
 For more details on DEA techniques and analysis, see, for example, Farrell (1957), Charnes et al. (1978), 
Thanassoulis (2001), and Coelli et al. (2002). 
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given the amount of inputs employed. More specifically, economic efficiency is a 
combination of technical and allocation efficiency. The former indicates the competence with 
which inputs are transformed into valued outputs and the latter whether input use ensures a 
minimal cost for the given market prices. The current study is concerned with technical 
efficiency. Hence, it considers country governments as producers of one output (absolute or 
relative redistribution) by using two costly inputs: government expenditures and taxes. 
The DEA methodology assumes the existence of a production possibilities frontier (an 
“envelope”) that defines which linear combination of observed input-output bundles are 
feasible. Assuming that the prices or multipliers ru and iv associated with r outputs (y) and j
inputs (x) are known, the relative efficiency of unit or country i ( ni ,...,1 ) can be expressed 
as the ratio of the weighted outputs to the weighted inputs:


j
jjj
r
rjr
xv
yu
However, as multipliers 
are unknown, Charnes et al. (1978) introduced a linear programming problem where the 
weights are not pre-assigned, but generated as a by-product of the statistical estimation 
process. The dual form of the original model is equivalent to the “output-oriented 
envelopment” program that aims to maximize the output production of each DMU (country) 
subject to a given input level. Analytically, the linear programming output-oriented problem 
to be solved for country i is as follows (see Afonso et al. 2013):  
 
 
                                                  

,
iMáx                             (1.i) 
 
                                           Subject to: 
                                                           
0  Yyii              (1.ii) 
                                                           
0 Xxi                (1.iii) 
                                                           11
' n                     (1.iv) 
                                                           0                         (1.v) 
 
 
We assume that there are k inputs and m  outputs for n  countries. For country i , iy is the 
column vector of results and ix is the vector of inputs. We can define X  as the input matrix 
with dimensions ( nk * ), and Y  as the output matrix with dimensions ( nm* ). 
 
The “output-efficiency score” represented by i  is the optimal solution to this problem (see 
equation 1.i), a scalar that satisfies 11 
i
, that measures the distance between country i and 
the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of those observations with best 
practices in the sample. More specifically, it indicates the proportion in which output iy  needs 
to increase, for the iDMU (or country i) to be located on the production possibility frontier. It 
is important to note that this method considers indicators of relative efficiency within the 
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sample of individuals (in our case, countries) analyzed. If 11 
i
, the country is within the 
frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while 1i implies that the country is on the efficiency frontier 
(i.e. efficient).  
Equation (1.ii) stands for the “output constraint” indicating that the weighted sum of outputs 
from all DMUs (countries) in the sample must be greater than or equal to the potential output 
for DMUi given the “input constraint” shown by equation (1.iii).  
The vector is a ( 1*n ) vector of constants that measure the weights used to compute the 
location of an inefficient country if it were to become efficient, and 1n  is a n-dimensional 
vector of 1 ones. The restriction 11' n  (equation 1.iv) imposes convexity on the frontier. 
Finally, it’s important to mention that this problem is solved for each of the n  countries for 
the purpose of obtaining n efficiency indicators. 
When performing DEA analysis several decisions must be taken. One concerns the choice 
between an input or output orientation. Whereas an input-oriented model maintains the 
current level of output constant and minimizes inputs, an output-oriented model maximizes 
output given the amount of inputs. We choose the latter model because we are interested in 
assessing the redistributive efficiency of given levels of public spending and taxation. In other 
words, the frontier methodology applied in this study takes governments as producers 
combining two inputs (public spending and taxes) to obtain one output (measured through 
relative redistribution or absolute redistribution). Governments are considered more efficient 
if they produce a larger output for given inputs. The DEA methodology translates efficiency 
into “scores”, and based on these scores, one can build ordinal rankings of a country’s relative 
performance (Coelli and Perelman 1999). Another decision is whether to apply constant or 
variable returns to scale in the production function. The original applications of Charnes 
(1978) linear programming problem assumes Constant Returns to Scale (CRS), implying that 
all DMUs are operating at their technically most efficient scale and able to scale the inputs 
and outputs linearly without increasing or decreasing efficiency. Banker et al. (1984) was the 
first to incorporate variable returns to scale (VRS) to account for agents not operating at their 
optimal scale. In this way, the production frontier is kept with the observed efficiency peers 
only: that is, the DMUs which entail a closer reference for the one DMU under analysis. VRS 
allows countries to be compared to similar economies. We employ VRS since our inputs are 
ratio data and, as explained by Hollingsworth et al. (2003), in that case the model with the 
VRS constraint performs better.  
 
3. 2 Analyzing the non-discretionary factors: a panel data approach  
The DEA method assumes that output efficiency is purely the result of “discretionary inputs” 
and as such ignores the influence of “non-discretionary factors” or environmental variables 
which may also impact on efficiency. These are considered as non-controllable inputs because 
they cannot be directly manipulated by the producer but do influence the DEA estimates (

 ). 
To account for this, we perform a second stage analysis where the DEA efficiency scores are 
regressed on a set of possible exogenous factors that might explain redistributive efficiency.
6
 
                                                 
6
 Other techniques imply first correcting the inputs and outputs by the effect of non-discretionary inputs and then 
applying a new DEA to the adjusted values. Also, there are different approaches to ensure the exogeneity of 
factors (see Simar and Wilson 2011, for an overview). 
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Thus, we undertake a parametric regression analysis, by regressing the estimated output 
efficiency scores

 , on a set of possible non-discretionary factors, Z: 
ititit Za  

 (2) 
 
Where i  refers to the countries in the sample, t represents the time period, a  is a constant,   
is the vector of parameters assessing the influence of non-discretionary inputs or explanatory 
variables ( itZ ) on efficiency, and it is a statistical noise.  
Following McDonald (2009) and Simar and Wilson (2000, 2007, 2011), the DEA efficiency 
scores are corner solutions meaning that they are truncated (with truncation at 1) to respect the 
bounded domain of efficiency scores and their true data generating process. A corner solution 
variable is continuous and limited from above and/or below, and takes the value of one of the 
boundaries with a positive probability. The authors argue that truncation reflects the 
accumulation of observations at 1 stemming from the way the DEA scores are computed. A 
score of 1 is just an estimated bound for the true (unobserved) efficiency, as even the best 
producers have room for improvement. Because of this, truncated regression provides 
consistent estimations in the second stage of our analysis.
7
 
In relation to these non-discretionary factors, we include an indicator of government 
effectiveness, another capturing the importance of the shadow economy, country size (in 
terms of population), measures of market income and educational inequalities, the degree of 
ethnic fractionalization, the welfare regime in place and the logarithm of the GDP per capita 
(we justify the choice of these variables in section 4.3). 
 
4 Data 
In this section we elaborate further on the indicators employed to measure redistribution, and 
discuss the other variables included in the DEA and the subsequent panel regression analysis. 
We construct a balanced panel of 28 developed economies taking four-year periods from 1995 
to 2010, basing our selection of countries and time period on the availability, frequency and 
quality of the data.
8
 We follow the same 28 countries for the all period analyzed (1995 to 
2010). 
 
4.1 The DEA output variable: redistribution  
Woo et al. (2013) explain the main limitations of the most widely used datasets on income 
inequality in the last decades namely, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID) of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER 2008): 
the first dataset suffers from low coverage (in terms of years and countries considered) and 
                                                 
7
 For some scholars DEA scores are descriptive measures of technical efficiency with respect to an observed 
best-practice inferred from a sample (Hoff 2007; McDonald 2009; Ramalho et al. 2010).Therefore, the scores 
can be regressed by Ordinary Least Squares or other Maximum Likelihood specification like any other 
dependent variable. In any case, this approach and the one used in this article agree on the unsuitability of Tobit 
regressions, which wrongly take the concentration of DEA scores at 1 as reflecting a censoring mechanism. 
8
 See appendix for the list of countries included (Table A.1), for the summary statistics (Table A.2), and for the 
sources of all the data employed (Table A.3). 
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reduced comparability across countries and years, while the second one is also hampered by 
the use of different income definitions.
9
 
Considering this context, we take advantage of a recently updated cross-country dataset by 
Solt (2009 and 2014) that combines data from LIS and UNU-WIDER. This dataset, labeled 
SWIID, provides information on market and net income inequality in some 174 developing 
and advanced countries from 1960 to 2013. We restrict ourselves to a more reliable sub-
sample of countries for which we have information on redistribution, government spending 
and taxation and also on the explanatory variables included in the second stage regressions. 
Specifically, we focus on a sample of 28 OECD countries and the four-year periods starting in 
1995 and extending to 2010.
10
 
As previously stated, our chosen variables for measuring redistribution are obtained as the 
difference between the Gini coefficient for market and for net income (absolute measure), and 
the same difference weighted on the Gini coefficient for market income (relative measure). 
Some scholars have measured redistribution in absolute terms taking just the difference 
between both Gini indicators (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, Wang et al. 2014 and 2012, 
Thewissen 2014), while others consider redistribution in relative terms arguing that the 
percentage reduction in inequality captured by the relative redistribution measure is a better 
reflection of redistributive effort (Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler and Jesuit 2006; Iversen and 
Soskice 2011; Huber and Stephens 2014). For the purpose of measuring the redistributive 
efficiency of fiscal policy we have used alternatively both measures as the output DEA 
variable, and obtained two different set of efficiency scores, which we use in the second stage 
regressions.  
 
4.2 The input variables of the DEA 
We include two input variables in the DEA namely, total public spending and total taxes, both 
as a percentage of GDP and taken from the Eurostat and OECD Statistics. It is important to 
remark that while the spending variable covers almost the totality of non-financial public 
expenditure, the tax variable represents a clearly lower percentage of total fiscal revenues 
because it does not include non-tax revenues.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the relationship between both aggregate fiscal measures and relative 
and absolute redistribution respectively for our extended sample of 28 countries and show a 
clear positive relationship in both cases. This is as expected since, on the one hand, public 
expenditure includes a variety of social expenditures with distributive implications (cash 
transfers like pensions or in-kind transfers in the form of health and education spending) and, 
on the other hand, countries with higher tax burdens tend to have a more progressive tax 
structure. Of course, these figures are silent on the crucial issue of the redistributive efficiency 
of fiscal policies.  
                                                 
9
 For different definitions of income concepts, see Lustig and Higgins (2012). 
10
 More details on Solt’s database may be found at: http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html. Babones and 
Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007) explain some of the advantages of SWIID database while Jenkins (2014) provides a 
comparative analysis between the WIID and SWIID databases. It is important to note that for those few countries 
and years for which data is available for both data bases, the market and net income inequality measures 
employed in this article are very similar.  
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4.3 The non-discretionary variables for the regression analysis 
We account for a range of non-discretionary factors that might explain redistributive 
efficiency differences across countries. One set of factors relates to what Afonso et al. (2010) 
call, “public sector technology” or, in other words, the restrictions faced by public officials 
who must design and implement redistributive policies. In this sense we include a variable 
from the World Governance Indicators labeled “Government Effectiveness” that describes 
“the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al. 2010, 
p. 4).
11
 The basic argument is that an inefficient public administration implies poor design and 
implementation of policies (Rajkumar and Swaroom 2008) and consequently, we would 
expect countries with less competent bureaucracies to redistribute less for a given volume of 
resources employed towards this aim. Another variable potentially undermining the capacity 
of public officials to redistribute efficiently is the importance of the underground economy. A 
flourishing shadow economy may cause severe difficulties for politicians and public 
administrators, because official indicators (related to unemployment rate, income, etc.) may 
be distorted, and consequently fiscal policies based on erroneous indicators are likely to be 
ineffective (Schneider and Enste 2000). Moreover we account for population size (in logs) on 
the strength of the argument that larger countries may be more difficult to govern (Aristotle 
1932; Treisman 2002).  
Another set of factors affecting redistributive efficiency broadly stems from the structure of 
public spending and taxation. For a given volume of resources spent or taxed, the 
redistributive impact will depend on the specific tax and spending policies employed. 
Previous work has revealed that different spending and tax policies have different 
redistributive effects (measured in terms of either absolute or relative redistribution): for 
example, Wang et al. (2012, 2014) emphasize the redistributive impact of income tax and 
pensions and survivors benefits as well as social assistance in the form of disability and 
unemployment benefits while Huber and Stephens (2014) put the emphasis on unemployment 
benefits and transfers to single mother households.  
From this perspective, we account for factors on both the demand and supply side of the 
political market for redistribution that may affect the distributive profile of spending and 
taxation. Thus, we control for market income inequalities because of the expectation that in 
democratic and more unequal societies the median voter will be relatively poorer and will 
demand more redistributive tax and transfer policies (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Milanovic 
2000 and 2010; Ostry et al. 2014). Moreover, we control for ethnic heterogeneity since it has 
been argued that it may make agreement over tax and public spending decisions more difficult 
to reach because people may not be willing to transfer resources to people from “other” 
ethnicities (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Finally, we attempt to account for 
the possibility that, faced with demands for redistribution in the context of democratic states, 
wealthy elites employ their economic and political influence to undermine redistributive 
action by the state (Gupta et al. 2002; Rodríguez 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; 
Acemoglu et al. 2015). To account for elite influence, Acemoglu and co-authors employ a 
variable that measures land inequality. Unfortunately, this measure is not available for many 
of the countries included in our sample. Instead, we turn to educational inequalities under the 
                                                 
11
 We also employ a variable from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database as developed by the 
Political Risk Services Group that measures the quality of the bureaucracy. Our results are robust to the use of 
this alternative measure. These, and all the results mentioned in the article but not reported, are available upon 
request.  
11 
 
assumption that an unequal distribution in education may be indicative of elite influence. Of 
course, education inequalities are likely to influence market inequalities, but the fact that we 
also include the latter in the regressions allows us to control for this potentially confounding 
effect.  
Beyond these two sets of factors we also control for GDP per capita (in logs) in an attempt to 
account for the possibility that wealthier countries may enjoy a higher level of redistributive 
efficiency for a range of observable (but omitted) or unobservable non-discretionary factors 
related to development. Moreover, we further pursue the idea that redistributive efficiency 
depends on the redistributive orientation of spending and taxation by controlling for the 
welfare-state regime in place (see, Kammer et al. 2012). Specifically, we consider four 
different types of welfare regimes in our sample of countries according the characteristics of 
their tax and transfer systems based on the Joumard et al. (2012) classification which uses 19 
policy indicators of the size, mix and progressivity of taxes and public expenditure. In short, 
they classify OECD countries into four groups or regimes, according to their tax and transfer 
systems. The first regime is characterized by large cash transfers to households (not 
dominated by old-age pensions) and by high tax to GDP ratios (with a large role for direct 
taxes).The second one features large cash transfers to households dominated by old-age 
pensions, and high tax to GDP ratios but with a marginal role of personal income tax. The 
third system presents relatively small cash transfers and taxes combined with a large role of 
property and personal income taxes. Finally, the fourth one is characterized by relatively low 
public spending (and dominated by in-kind services rather than in cash transfers) and 
consumption taxes play a dominant role in total taxes.
12
 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Redistributive efficiency 
In table 1 and 2 we present the DEA efficiency scores obtained using two inputs (government 
expenditure and taxes) and one output, relative and absolute redistribution respectively for the 
four-year sub-periods.
13
 The tables indicate that, in general, the country scores are slightly 
higher when using relative (as opposed to absolute) redistribution, and moreover country 
performances do not change radically through time. This said, it is also true that the DEA 
results differ using both indicators, as we detail next. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Focusing first on the DEA using relative redistribution, it is possible to observe from Table 1 
that the Czech Republic, Sweden and Australia emerge as the most efficient countries in the 
sample since they are located very close to the efficient frontier during all the period, but also 
other Nordic European countries show very high scores (this would be the case of Finland, 
Norway, Denmark, Latvia and also the Netherlands). Interestingly, two of these countries 
(Australia and Latvia) are clearly above the average performer but using below average inputs 
(see, figures 2 and 3). Another set of countries is located on the opposite end (Estonia, 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain and the United States and Estonia), with Bulgaria being by 
                                                 
12
 The seminal contribution identifying different types of welfare states is, of course, Esping-Andersen (1990).  
13
 Efficiency scores have been computed using the DPIN (Decomposing Productivity Index Numbers) 3.0 
software by O’Donnell (2010) and the EMS (Efficiency Measurement System) by Scheel (2000). Apart from the 
score, the DPIN measures “technical change” while EMS permits the identification of outliers. 
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far the worst performer. Table 1 shows that, on average, countries could have increased their 
redistributive efficiency by almost 20 percent using the same resources. 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 shows the results when employing instead absolute redistribution as the output 
measure. The results are similar but not identical. Thus, Latvia, Sweden, Finland and 
Australia, still appear in the group of the most efficient countries, but the Czech Republic and 
Norway present much lower scores while Hungary and Germany take their place. On the 
other extreme, Bulgaria continues to be the least efficient country, and is accompanied by the 
same group of countries as before, with the only exception of Switzerland which now is very 
far from the efficient frontier. 
These differences are explained by the fact that relative redistribution is weighted by initial 
inequality while absolute redistribution is not. While both indicators are useful to measure 
redistribution and, by extension, redistributive efficiency, arguably, the relative measure may 
be more appropriate since it provides a more complete indication of the change in 
redistribution produced by fiscal policies. To see this, consider the case of two countries with 
similar public spending and taxation relative to GDP that obtain a net income Gini 18 points 
below the market Gini. But while the first country goes from 53 to 35 (these numbers 
approximate the case of United Kingdom), the second country moves from 43 to 25 
(Norway). Measuring redistribution in absolute terms would lead us to conclude that they 
have been equally effective in redistributing income. Employing relative redistribution 
however indicates that Norway redistributes more than United Kingdom (Norway 0.43, 
United Kingdom 0.35). In other words, a more unequal country (United Kingdom) will 
present a lower level of relative redistribution than a more equal country (Norway) even if the 
two countries implement redistribution policies that result in a similar reduction in income 
inequality (or absolute redistribution). 
 
The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that, on the one hand, redistributive efficiency 
is very low in Bulgaria and relatively low in the Southern European countries and United 
States, and on the other hand, public spending and taxation redistributes income relatively 
efficiently in the Nordic and Central European countries as well as Australia. 
 
5.2 Explaining redistributive inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors: a panel data 
analysis 
Table 3 reports the results obtained using panel data truncated regressions of the estimated 
efficiency scores that appear in Table 1 on the non-discretionary factors presented in section 
4.3. The panel regressions are performed with a truncation of the dependent variable 
(efficiency score) at 1, which excludes the “efficient units” with that score (see Simar and 
Wilson 2000, 2007, and 2011). For robustness purposes, in table 4 we report the results of 
OLS panel data. 
The results reported in both tables confirm the expected effect of the non-discretionary 
factors. We find that redistributive efficiency increases with government effectiveness and 
decreases with shadow economies and population. This is consistent with the expectation that 
smaller countries with better quality public administrations and with smaller underground 
economies are better able to design and implement redistributive policies. 
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Tables 3 and 4 about here 
Moreover, we find that market inequalities increase redistributive efficiency while ethnic 
fractionalization and educational inequalities reduce it. Again, this is in line with the expected 
effect of these variables on the redistributive orientation of public spending and taxation. 
Market inequalities imply a demand for more redistributive tax and transfer policies while 
ethnic heterogeneity implies the opposite. Educational inequality, as a proxy of elite 
influence, is associated with less redistributive efficiency, something which is consistent with 
the argument that economic elites in democratic countries may use their economic power to 
influence the suppliers of public policies with the aim of circumventing redistributive 
demands stemming from the electorate.  
The results reported in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 of both tables also indicate the relevance of 
welfare regimes for redistributive efficiency. Taking regime type number 4 as the base 
category, our findings suggest that redistributive efficiency increases in systems where large 
cash transfers dominated by old-age pensions, high tax to GDP ratios and a marginal role of 
personal income tax (regime type 2), while the positive effect is even stronger in regimes 
characterized by large cash transfers to households not dominated by old-age pensions and by 
high tax to GDP ratios, with a large role for direct taxes (regime type 1). 
As can be seen in Table 4, changing the estimation method, something which implies a larger 
number of observations because OLS includes the “efficient units” or countries with an 
efficiency score equal to 1, does not alter our results and confirms the sign, magnitude and 
significance of the estimated coefficients. 
We pursue the robustness of our results further in several ways. In particular, we control for 
an additional range of factors that can influence the redistributive orientation of fiscal 
policies. Thus we control for unemployment rates and demographic factors (in the guise of 
the percentage of population between 0 and 14 year old or above 65 years of age) under the 
assumption that this will capture public spending on education and pensions. We also control 
for proportional representation systems and the presence of presidential systems since Persson 
and Tabellini (2004) have explained that proportional electoral rules may create incentives to 
increase spending on universalistic redistributive programs while presidential systems should 
be associated with a reduction in such programs. We do not find any of these variables to 
have a statistically significant impact on redistributive efficiency, nor do they alter our 
results
14
.  
Finally, it is important to consider that because DEA is a data driven approach where the 
scores are obtained by an implicit data-generating process, it is convenient to analyze the 
sensitivity of the estimated efficiency scores to sampling variation (bootstrapping). More 
specifically, Simar and Wilson (2007) also state that DEA efficiency scores present two kinds 
of biases. One, because they are dependent on each other, so they are serially correlated in an 
unknown way. The other, because non-discretionary variables might be correlated to the error 
term through the relationship between non-discretionary inputs and the outputs used to 
estimate the scores. As both correlations tend to disappear asymptotically, the original 
estimator is applied to a bootstrap simulated sample by a truncated regression, producing 
estimates that imitate the sampling distribution of the original estimator and are valid to do 
inference. Bootstrapping involves repeated simulations of the data generating process (Simar 
and Wilson 1998 and 2000). Thus, as an additional robustness test, all the efficiency scores 
obtained in the first stage of our DEA analysis are corrected through this bootstrapping 
                                                 
14
 Results not reported.  
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procedure.
15
 Then, in the second stage or regression analysis, the bias-corrected efficiency 
scores obtained for each of the four-year means over the period 1995 to 2010, are regressed 
on the non-discretionary explanatory variables using the truncated regression model. The 
panel bootstrap regressions are performed with a truncation of the dependent variable 
(efficiency score) at 1, which excludes the “efficient units”. Bootstrapping is performed by 
taking 1000 withdrawals of residuals from a left-truncated normal distribution, and then re-
estimating the truncated regression for each drawing. Employing this bootstrapping procedure 
does not change our second-stage regression results and confirms the sign and significance of 
the estimated coefficients.
16
 
 
6 Conclusions 
Theoretical and empirical work suggests that income inequality could have a negative impact 
on economic development. The redistributive potential of fiscal policy, both on the tax and 
spending sides, can therefore play an important role in both reducing inequalities and raising 
long-term growth. In the context of increasing income inequalities and scarce budgetary 
resources experienced by many countries, attention needs to be paid to the efficiency of fiscal 
policy in redistributing income. Efficiency alleviates budget constraints as it facilitates the 
attainment of greater levels of redistribution at given levels of spending and taxation. In this 
paper, we empirically evaluate the redistributive efficiency of aggregate public spending and 
taxation through the DEA methodology and we then use the efficiency scores obtained to 
analyze the determinants of cross-country variation in efficiency through panel regression 
analysis. Because fiscal policies have other objectives, it is important to state that we are not 
trying to evaluate the efficiency of the public sector beyond redistribution. Moreover it is 
worth pointing out that one limitation of the analysis undertaken in this article is that it does 
not capture all the policies that governments can use to redistribute beyond transfer and tax 
policies. For example, governments can also redistribute through labor regulations (minimum 
wages, retirement age, and affirmative action and gender policies). 
Our first stage results – obtained through the DEA methodology and based on a panel of 
28OECD developed countries for the period 1995-2010 – reveals important differences in 
redistributive efficiency across countries. Specifically we identify higher efficiency levels in 
the Nordic and Central European countries and Australia, while the Southern European 
countries and the United States display much lower levels of efficiency and consequently a 
greater scope for improvement. Moreover, our second stage results point to the crucial role 
when explaining redistributive efficiency differences across countries of factors reflecting on 
the capacity of governments to design and implement public policies, as well as variables 
affecting the redistributive profile of fiscal policies stemming from the demand and supply 
sides of the political market for redistribution.  
  
                                                 
15
 We employ two thousand bootstrap replications (for similar procedures see, also, Wolszczak-Derlacz and 
Parteka 2011 and Varabyova and Schreyögg 2013). 
16
 Truncated regression allows us to take advantage of the bootstrap procedure and performs well in terms of 
confidence intervals coverage (see Simar and Wilson 2007). This empirical evidence, as well as the bootstrap 
Stata codes, are not present here, due to space constraints. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1 List of countries 
 
Country Code Country 
Australia AUS 
Austria AUT 
Belgium BEL 
Bulgaria BGR 
Canada CAN 
Czech Republic CZE 
Denmark DNK 
Estonia EST 
Finland FIN 
France FRA 
Germany DEU 
Greece GRC 
Hungary HUN 
Ireland IRL 
Italy ITA 
Latvia LVA 
The Netherlands NLD 
New Zealand NZL 
Norway NOR 
Poland POL 
Portugal PRT 
Slovakia SVK 
Slovenia SVN 
Spain ESP 
Sweden SWE 
Switzerland CHE 
United Kingdom GBR 
The United States USA 
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Table A.2 - Summary statistics  
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
Redistribution Efficiency Score (Relative 
Redistribution) 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.837 
 
0.182 
0.169 
0.072 
0.058 
0.225 
0.524 
1 
1 
1 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Redistribution efficiency Score (Absolute 
Redistribution) 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.790 
 
0.192 
0.175 
0.083 
0.045 
0.151 
0.422 
1 
1 
1 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Relative Redistribution 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
36.196 
 
9.331 
8.885 
3.202 
2.040 
8.526 
22.658 
54.358 
49.769 
51.386 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Absolute Redistribution 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
17.152 
 
4.670 
4.262 
2.033 
0.748 
3.030 
8.735 
26.482 
23.416 
27.271 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Public Expenditure (over GDP) 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
36.260 
 
5.886 
5.847 
1.176 
26.244 
27.623 
32.129 
48.275 
47.612 
41.254 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Public Taxes (over GDP) 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
44.372 
 
6.327 
5.956 
2.350 
32.600 
34.751 
39.141 
60.350 
54.644 
54.216 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Education Inequality 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
15.240 
 
7.009 
6.591 
2.620 
2.624 
6.346 
8.097 
33.198 
31.592 
24.690 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.255 
 
0.193 
0.196 
 
0.047 
0.047 
 
0.712 
0.712 
 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Gini Market Income 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
46.979 
 
4.762 
4.282 
2.199 
32.152 
34.129 
38.616 
58.532 
54.140 
55.752 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Gini Net Income 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
29.827 
 
4.381 
4.292 
1.125 
21.937 
23.130 
27.143 
37.820 
37.347 
34.012 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.378 
 
0.611 
0.605 
0.130 
-0.276 
-0.005 
0.879 
2.231 
2.120 
1.743 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Log of per-capita GDP 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
10.094 
 
0.480 
0.468 
0.134 
8.781 
9.046 
9.700 
11.042 
10.974 
10.430 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Log of Population 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.507 
 
1.237 
1.253 
0.031 
0.294 
0.313 
2.420 
5.725 
5.666 
2.601 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Shadow Economy 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
19.519 
 
6.974 
7.034 
0.708 
8.100 
8.512 
16.955 
37.300 
35.264 
21.555 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Welfare Regime_1 
 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.321 
 
0.469 
0.476 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Welfare Regime_2 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.301 
 
0.420 
0.456 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Welfare Regime_3 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.250 
 
0.435 
0.441 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
Welfare Regime_4 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.143 
 
0.351 
0.356 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
N = 112 
n = 28 
T = 4 
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Table A.3 Data definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Gini Market Income Gini coefficient based on market income inequality. Solt (2014) 
Gini Net Income Gini coefficient based on net income inequality. Solt (2014) 
Relative Redistribution Market-income inequality minus net-income inequality, divided by market-income inequality. Solt (2014) 
Absolute Redistribution Market-income inequality minus net-income inequality Solt (2014) 
Government 
Effectiveness (WGI) 
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
World Governance Indicators 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in logs (RGDPCNA, 2005 PPP$). Penn World Table 8.1 database 
Public Expenditure Total Expense of general government as a share of GDP Eurostat and OECD Statistics 
Public Taxes Public total taxes of general government as a share of GDP Eurostat and OECD Statistics 
Education Inequality Gini index of education Castelló and Doménech (2014) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
The probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different 
groups, computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares. 
Alesina et al. (2003). 
Population Population 
World Development Indicators of 
World Bank (WDI) 
Welfare Regime Tax and transfer system Joumard et al. (2012) 
Shadow Economy Includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed 
from public authorities 
Schneider et al. (2010 and 2013) 
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Tables and figures to be embedded in the text 
 
Figure 1 - Redistribution and net income inequality, by country (averages 1995 – 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Solt (2014). 
A
U
S
A
U
T
B
EL
B
G
R
C
A
N
C
ZE
D
N
K
E
ST
FI
N
FR
A
D
E
U
G
R
C
H
U
N
IR
L
IT
A
LV
A
N
LD
N
ZL
N
O
R
P
O
L
P
R
T
S
VK
S
VN
E
SP
S
W
E
C
H
E
G
B
R
U
S
A
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 r
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
%
)
20 25 30 35 40
Gini net income (%)
A
U
S
A
U
T
B
EL
B
G
R
C
A
N
C
ZE
D
N
K
E
ST
FI
N
FR
A
D
E
U
G
R
C
H
U
N
IR
L
IT
A
LV
AN
LD
N
ZL
N
O
R P
O
L
P
R
T
S
VK
S
VN
E
SP
S
W
E
C
H
E
G
B
R
U
S
A
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 r
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
%
)
20 25 30 35 40
Gini net income (%)
Group II 
Group III 
Group I 
Group I 
Group II 
Group III 
24 
 
Figure 2 - Public expenditure, taxes and relative redistribution (1995 – 2010 average) 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Solt (2014), the Eurostat and OECD Statistics 
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Figure 3 - Public expenditure, taxes and absolute redistribution (1984 – 2012 average) 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Solt (2014), the Eurostat and OECD Statistics 
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Table 1 – Relative Redistributive efficiency by country (output oriented VRS TE) 
 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 1995-2010 
Country 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Average 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
 
Australia 1,000 1 1,000 4 0,938 13 1,000 5 0,985 3 
Austria 0,739 19 0,873 16 0,843 19 0,741 24 0,799 19 
Belgium 0,930 8 0,892 14 0,908 15 0,892 14 0,906 13 
Bulgaria 0,058 28 0,350 27 0,386 28 0,106 28 0,225 28 
Canada 0,798 17 0,748 21 0,805 22 0,787 20 0,785 21 
Czech Republic 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 
Denmark 0,874 14 1,000 1 1,000 1 0,946 10 0,955 8 
Estonia 0,563 26 0,730 23 0,817 20 0,790 19 0,725 23 
Finland 1,000 1 0,995 6 0,982 10 0,942 11 0,980 5 
France 0,785 18 0,877 15 0,873 17 0,849 17 0,846 16 
Germany 0,878 12 0,949 8 0,979 11 0,964 8 0,943 10 
Greece 0,638 24 0,649 25 0,705 26 0,760 22 0,688 24 
Hungary 0,893 11 0,944 10 1,000 1 0,912 12 0,937 12 
Ireland 0,851 15 0,906 11 1,000 8 1,000 1 0,939 11 
Italy 0,579 25 0,645 26 0,705 25 0,694 25 0,656 26 
Latvia 0,937 7 1,000 3 1,000 7 0,964 7 0,975 6 
The Netherlands 0,969 5 1,000 5 0,998 9 0,958 9 0,981 4 
New Zealand 0,738 20 0,853 19 0,883 16 0,690 26 0,791 20 
Norway 0,904 10 0,904 13 1,000 1 1,000 6 0,952 9 
Poland 0,867 14 0,905 12 0,914 14 0,822 18 0,877 15 
Portugal 0,382 27 0,252 28 0,745 24 0,878 16 0,564 27 
Slovakia 0,913 9 0,947 9 1,000 1 1,000 1 0,965 7 
Slovenia 0,849 16 0,872 17 0,948 12 0,895 13 0,891 14 
Spain 0,718 21 0,737 22 0,772 23 0,768 21 0,749 22 
Sweden 1,000 1 0,972 7 1,000 1 1,000 1 0,993 2 
Switzerland 0,665 23 0,799 20 0,865 18 0,883 15 0,803 18 
United Kingdom 0,949 6 0,864 18 0,805 21 0,752 23 0,843 17 
The United States 0,699 22 0,661 24 0,698 27 0,652 27 0,678 25 
Average 0,792 -- 0,833 -- 0,877 -- 0,844 -- 0,837 -- 
Note:  All results are based on one output (relative redistribution) and two inputs (public expenditure and public taxes). 
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Table 2 – Absolute Redistributive efficiency by country (output oriented VRS TE) 
 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 1995-2010 
Country 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
Average 
Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking 
 
Australia 1,000 3 0,922 8 0,813 17 1,000 3 0,934 6 
Austria 0,658 21 0,844 16 0,768 19 0,669 25 0,735 18 
Belgium 0,914 8 0,917 9 0,852 15 0,836 14 0,880 10 
Bulgaria 0,045 28 0,218 28 0,244 28 0,096 28 0,151 28 
Canada 0,756 16 0,722 19 0,734 22 0,726 20 0,735 19 
Czech Republic 0,888 10 0,864 14 0,894 9 0,867 13 0,878 12 
Denmark 0,774 15 0,945 7 0,926 7 0,893 9 0,885 9 
Estonia 0,483 26 0,681 21 0,739 21 0,721 23 0,656 23 
Finland 1,000 1 1,000 1 0,936 5 0,910 7 0,962 3 
France 0,784 14 0,908 11 0,866 13 0,899 8 0,864 14 
Germany 0,827 13 0,980 5 0,972 3 0,983 6 0,941 5 
Greece 0,649 22 0,651 24 0,639 26 0,730 19 0,667 22 
Hungary 0,967 5 1,000 3 1,000 1 0,875 12 0,961 4 
Ireland 0,848 11 0,787 18 0,926 6 1,000 1 0,890 8 
Italy 0,559 24 0,654 23 0,698 23 0,686 24 0,649 24 
Latvia 0,957 6 1,000 1 1,000 1 1,000 1 0,989 1 
The Netherlands 0,912 9 0,950 6 0,912 8 0,882 11 0,914 7 
New Zealand 0,683 20 0,850 15 0,879 12 0,654 26 0,767 17 
Norway 0,749 18 0,796 17 0,884 11 0,892 10 0,830 16 
Poland 0,924 7 0,895 12 0,888 10 0,774 17 0,870 13 
Portugal 0,357 27 0,223 27 0,797 18 0,987 5 0,591 27 
Slovakia 0,837 12 0,915 10 0,860 14 0,808 15 0,855 15 
Slovenia 0,626 23 0,671 22 0,740 20 0,721 22 0,690 21 
Spain 0,754 17 0,690 20 0,672 24 0,726 21 0,711 20 
Sweden 0,990 4 0,980 4 0,955 4 1,000 4 0,981 2 
Switzerland 0,507 26 0,591 26 0,664 25 0,735 18 0,624 26 
United Kingdom 1,000 1 0,891 13 0,830 16 0,793 16 0,879 11 
The United States 0,732 19 0,599 25 0,596 27 0,622 27 0,637 25 
Average 0,756 -- 0,791 -- 0,810 -- 0,803 -- 0,790 -- 
Note:  All results are based on one output (absolute redistribution) and two inputs (public expenditure and public taxes). 
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Table 3 –Truncated model results (dependent variable: output efficiency scores) 
 
Technical Efficiency Scores of Relative Redistribution Technical Efficiency Scores of Absolute Redistribution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 
0.232*** 
(0.044) 
-- 
0.141*** 
(0.038) 
-- 
0.180*** 
(0.032) 
-- 
0.126*** 
(0.029) 
-- 
Shadow Economy -- 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-- 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-- 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
Log of Population 
-0.069*** 
(0.019) 
-0.091*** 
(0.025) 
-0.044*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.038*** 
(0.015) 
-0.055*** 
(0.017) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.033*** 
(0.010) 
Gini Market 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0. 026*** 
(0.003) 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.003) 
0.037*** 
(0.003) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.375*** 
(0.124) 
-0.327*** 
(0.138) 
-0.191** 
(0.097) 
-0.177* 
(0.105) 
-0.339*** 
(0.088) 
-0.327*** 
(0.095) 
-0.142** 
(0.067) 
-0.148** 
(0.073) 
Education Inequality 
-1.526*** 
(0.336) 
-1.420*** 
(0.390) 
-1.965*** 
(0.272) 
-1.916*** 
(0.309) 
-1.195*** 
(0.234) 
-1.025*** 
(0.260) 
-1.562*** 
(0.183) 
-1.434*** 
(0.211) 
Log of per-capita GDP 
0.001 
(0.023) 
0.051** 
(0.026) 
-0.025 
(0.017) 
0.005 
(0.046) 
-0.057 
(0.045) 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
-0.084*** 
(0.015) 
-0.036 
(0.034) 
Welfare regime_1 -- -- 
0.318*** 
(0.065) 
0.354*** 
(0.078) 
-- -- 
0.267*** 
(0.050) 
0.284*** 
(0.059) 
Welfare regime_2 -- -- 
0.191*** 
(0.056) 
0.174*** 
(0.070) 
-- -- 
0.202*** 
(0.041) 
0.155*** 
(0.052) 
Welfare regime_3 -- -- 
0.006 
(0.057) 
-0.011 
(0.083) 
-- -- 
0.017 
(0.044) 
-0.017 
(0.064) 
Log-likelihood 88.130 81.544 105.344 101.558 92.958 77.740 115.111 102.806 
Observations 89 89 89 89 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include a 
constant (not shown). 
  
31 
 
Table 4 –OLS model results (dependent variable: output efficiency scores) 
 
Technical Efficiency Scores of Relative Redistribution Technical Efficiency Scores of Absolute Redistribution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Government Effectiveness (WGI) 
0.121*** 
(0.021) 
-- 
0.110*** 
(0.025) 
-- 
0.135*** 
(0.020) 
-- 
0.128*** 
(0.023) 
-- 
Shadow Economy -- 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Log of Population 
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
-0.055*** 
(0.010) 
-0.039*** 
(0.008) 
-0.046*** 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.041*** 
(0.010) 
-0.024*** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
Gini Market 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0. 021*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.026*** 
(0.002) 
0.025*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.190*** 
(0.059) 
-0.191*** 
(0.061) 
-0.064 
(0.055) 
-0.066 
(0.057) 
-0.237*** 
(0.054) 
-0.243*** 
(0.059) 
-0.119** 
(0.051) 
-0.127** 
(0.054) 
Education Inequality 
-1.134*** 
(0.167) 
-0.991*** 
(0.171) 
-1.491*** 
(0.150) 
-1.294*** 
(0.160) 
-0.953*** 
(0.154) 
-0.801*** 
(0.165) 
-1.257*** 
(0.138) 
-1.045*** 
(0.151) 
Log of per-capita GDP 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
0.056*** 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.047 
(0.048) 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
-0.023* 
(0.012) 
Welfare regime_1 -- -- 
0.206*** 
(0.066) 
0.186*** 
(0.043) 
-- -- 
0.170*** 
(0.036) 
0.170*** 
(0.041) 
Welfare regime_2 -- -- 
0.197*** 
(0.036) 
0.134*** 
(0.043) 
-- -- 
0.153*** 
(0.033) 
0.089** 
(0.041) 
Welfare regime_3 -- -- 
0.049 
(0.038) 
-0.008 
(0.051) 
-- -- 
0.013 
(0.035) 
-0.038 
(0.049) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.566 0.543 0.705 0.681 0.668 0.615 0.767 0.742 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include a 
constant (not shown). 
 
 
